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Abstract
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key
distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be
done in security proof. In addition to source loopholes and detection loopholes, channel attacks are
considered to be the main ways of information leakage, while collective attacks are considered to
be the most powerful active channel attacks. Here we deduce in detail the capability limit of Eve’s
collective attack, the most powerful attack scheme in channel attacks, in non-entangled quantum
key distribution, like BB84 and measurement-device-independent protocols, and entangled quan-
tum key distribution, like device-independent protocol, in which collective attack is composed of
quantum weak measurement and quantum unambiguous state discrimination detection. The theo-
retical results show that collective attacks are equivalent in entangled and non-entangled quantum
key distribution protocols. We also find that compared with the loose bond on Eve’s attack pro-
vided by security proof based on entanglement purification, the security proof against collective
attacks not only improves the system’s tolerable bit error rate, but also improves the key rate.
∗ zhaosm@njupt.edu.cn
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I. INTRODUCTION
Security proof is one of the most important components of quantum key distribution
(QKD)[1–5]. It is not only used to evaluate the validity of a protocol, but also to give
the maximum key rate that the protocol can extract. A QKD protocol is considered to be
secure in this case that after the two communication parties, Alice and Bob, complete the
transmission and measurement of quantum states and all post-processing, the probability
of eavesdropper Eve acquiring their shared key tends to be exponentially infinitesimal. The
security of QKD can be divided into two categories. The first category belongs to secu-
rity loopholes, such as imperfect light source[6–11] and detection loopholes[11–17]. Under
appropriate attack schemes, the information of shared keys between Alice and Bob can
be eavesdropped almost entirely. At present, many approaches have been proposed to close
these loopholes, such as decoy-state protocol for imperfect light source[18–20], measurement-
device-independent (MDI)-QKD protocols for detection loopholes[21–24].
The other category of QKD security is the channel-side leakage of information intro-
duced by imperfect devices in the transmission and measurement of quantum states, such
as the beam-splitting (BS) attack caused by the attenuation of quantum states[25], and the
collective attack scheme introduced by finite bit error rate (BER)[26–28]. The amount of
information lost by channel-side attacks will determine the amount of information needed
for secret amplification and the maximum tolerable BER by QKD. BS attack is a passive
attack scheme in which the attenuated photon states can be considered to be intercepted
and stored by Eve. The amount of information eavesdropped by Eve is determined by the
joint measurement probability between Eve and Alice and Bob. In contrast with BS attack,
collective attack is an active attack scheme. Eve uses weak measurement technology to
obtain as much information as possible about the shared quantum states between Alice and
Bob under certain perturbations. The security proof based on entanglement purification has
given the general loose bound of information consumed by secret amplification. Although
the security against collective attacks in the BB84 and B92 protocols[26, 27] has been proved,
there is no corresponding expression of the general bound. Furthermore, the Holove quantity
provided by DI-QKD security proof against collective attacks is not improved compared with
the entanglement purification protocol[28]. However, after knowing Eve’s attack strategy,
a tighter bound for information leakage should be obtained. We already know that QKD
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protocols based on single-photon and entangled states have equivalence. Like entanglement
purification protocols, we need to give the general expression of Holove quantity between
Eve and Alice and Bob under the collective attack for all QKDs.
In this paper, we will evaluate the performance of Eve’s collective attacks on different
kinds of QKDs by deducing the Holove quantity and the tolerable maximum bit error rate.
Firstly, we derive the maximum amount of information that Eve can steal using collective
attack in non-entangled QKD. Eve’s collective attack consists of quantum weak measurement
and quantum unambiguous state discrimination detection. Eve can perform any quantum
operation, and any operation of Eve only needs to obey quantum mechanics. Next, we extend
Eve’s collective attack to entangled QKD systems, and give the generality of collective attack
in these two kinds of QKD systems.
II. COLLECTIVE ATTACK IN NON-ENTANGLED QKD PROTOCOLS
Collective attack is currently considered to be the most powerful channel attack scheme.
In collective attack, Eve attaches his quantum state to each of the states transmitted be-
tween Alice and Bob independently. Eve performs a weak measurement operation on the
joint quantum states to entangle his state with the joint system of Alice and Bob. Eve
then stores his quantum state and re-sends the quantum state transmitted between Alice
and Bob. After Alice and Bob have completed state measurement and announcement of
measurement base, Eve then makes unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements
on the corresponding quantum state stored by him to obtain the shared information be-
tween Alice and Bob. We first show collective attacks in non-entangled two-dimensional
QKD protocols, such as BB84- and MDI-QKDs. These conclusions are then extended to
the entanglement-based QKD protocol.
A. Weak measurement
Assume that the quantum state space in QKD protocol is formed by orthogonal basis
vectors |p〉 and |q〉 which can interact with Eve’s system without any crossing, and the bases
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FIG. 1. Schematic illustration of Eve’s collective attack on BB84-QKD. Alice randomly prepares
a quantum state from two mutually unbiased bases and sends it to Bob. Bob randomly chooses
the measurement basis to measure quantum states. Eve uses weak measurements to implement
collective attack on the quantum states transmitted in the channel. The bit error rate caused by
this attack cannot exceed the agreed value of Alice and Bob.
in Z space and X space can be written as
|0〉 = a |p〉+ b |q〉 , |0〉 = b |p〉 − a |q〉 ,
|+〉 =
√
2
2
[(a+ b) |p〉 − (a− b) |q〉] , |+〉 =
√
2
2
[(a− b) |p〉+ (a+ b) |q〉] ,
(1)
where a and b are the normalization constants that satisfy a2 + b2 = 1. In BB84, as shown
in Fig. 1, Alice prepares these two sets of mutually-unbiased-bases (MUBs) with equal
probabilities and sends them to Bob. Eve has a powerful attack capability in the collective
attack scheme, any operation by Eve should only be restricted to the principle of quantum
mechanics. Eve is free to change the values of a and b in Eqs. (1). Assume that Eve’s initial
quantum state is |E〉, the weak measurement on the joint system is represented by a unitary
operator U ,
U |p〉 |E〉 = |αp〉 |Ep〉 ,
U |q〉 |E〉 = |βq〉 |Eq〉 ,
(2)
where |αp〉 and |βq〉 are obtained by rotating α and β degrees of |p〉 and |q〉 in a two-
dimensional plane under weak measurements, respectively, |Ep〉 and |Eq〉 are the corre-
sponding states stored by Eve, all the phase terms generated by the interaction are included
in |Ep〉 and |Eq〉. The unitary of operator U leads to the following equality
〈p|q〉 〈E|E〉 = 0 = 〈E| 〈q|U+U |q〉 |E〉 = 〈αp|βq〉 〈Ep|Eq〉 . (3)
In general, |Ep〉 and |Eq〉 are not necessary to be orthogonal to each other. Thus for any
quantum states |αp〉 and |βq〉, we have 〈αp|βq〉 = 0, which means that |p〉 and |q〉 are rotated
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at the same angle under weak measurement. After the unitary operation, Eve can reverse-
rotate |αp〉 and |βq〉 at the same angle to reduce the perturbation,
T |p〉 |E〉 = RU |p〉 |E〉 = |p〉 |Ep〉 ,
T |q〉 |E〉 = RU |q〉 |E〉 = |q〉 |Eq〉 .
(4)
Then the weak measurement on the states in Z bases can be written as
T |0〉 |E〉 = √p0,0 |0〉 |E0,0〉+√p0,1 |1〉 |E0,1〉 ,
T |1〉 |E〉 = √p1,0 |0〉 |E1,0〉+√p1,1 |1〉 |E1,1〉 ,
(5)
where |E0,0〉, |E0,1〉, |E1,0〉 and |E1,1〉 are the normalized states stored by Eve, and their
expressions are
|E0,0〉 = a
2 |Ep〉+ b2 |Eq〉√
1− 2a2b2 (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
|E1,1〉 = b
2 |Ep〉+ a2 |Eq〉√
1− 2a2b2 (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
|E0,1〉 = |E1,0〉 = ab (|Ep〉 − |Eq〉)√
2a2b2 (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
(6)
where θ is the phase difference between |Ep〉 and |Eq〉. The corresponding transition prob-
abilities p0,0, p0,1, p1,0 and p1,1 are
p0,0 = p1,1 = 1− 2a2b2 (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ) ,
p0,1 = p1,0 = 2a
2b2 (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ) .
(7)
The weak measurement on the states in Z bases can be written as
T |+〉 |E〉 = √p+,+ |+〉 |E+,+〉+√p+,− |−〉 |E+,−〉 ,
T |−〉 |E〉 = √p−,+ |+〉 |E−,+〉+√p−,− |−〉 |E−,−〉 ,
(8)
where |E+,+〉, |E+,−〉, |E−,+〉 and |E+,+〉 are the normalized states stored by Eve, and their
expressions are
|E+,+〉 = (a + b)
2 |Ep〉+ (a− b)2 |Eq〉√
1− 1
2
(1− 4a2b2) (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
|E−,−〉 = (a− b)
2 |Ep〉+ (a+ b)2 |Eq〉√
1− 1
2
(1− 4a2b2) (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
|E+,−〉 = |E−,+〉 = (a
2 − b2) (|Eq − Ep〉)√
1
2
(1− 4a2b2) (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ)
,
(9)
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and p+,+, p+,−, p−,+ and p−,− are the corresponding transition probabilities which satisfy
p+,+ = p−,− = 1− 1
2
(
1− 4a2b2) (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ) ,
p+,− = p−,+ =
1
2
(
1− 4a2b2) (1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ) .
(10)
From Eqs. (5) and (8), we can see that after the weak measurement performed by Eve,
Eve’s system is entangled with the state transmitted between Alice and Bob. From Bob’s
point of view, the quantum state he receives is
ρ =
1
4
[(p0,0 + p1,0) ρ0 + (p0,1 + p1,1) ρ1 + (p+,+ + p−,+) ρ+ + (p+,− + p−,−) ρ−]. (11)
In this case, the BER caused by weak measurement is
pe =
1
4
(p1,0 + p0,1 + p−,+ + p+,−) , (12)
After substituting Eqs. (7) and (10) into Eqs. (12), we can get
pe ≥ 1
4
(1− |〈Ep|Eq〉| cos θ) . (13)
It can be seen from Eqs. (13) that the BER pe is independent of the values of a and b, and
only depends on the inner product between |Ep〉 and |Eq〉. Here |〈Ep|Eq〉| denotes the degree
of discrimination between |Ep〉 and |Eq〉. The smaller the value of |〈Ep|Eq〉|, the higher the
probability that Eve could distinguish |Ep〉 and |Eq〉. As can be seen from Eqs. (13), when
the BER of the system pe is determined, θ = 0 is the best way to help Eve get information
from Alice and Bob.
B. Unambiguous state discrimination
After Alice and Bob have announced their selected bases, Eve makes appropriate mea-
surements on his stored quantum states to infer Alice’s information. The dependence of
Eve’s stored states on |Ep〉 and |Ep〉 is shown in Fig. 2. Quantum states |E0,1〉, |E1,0〉,
|E+,−〉 and |E−,+〉 are in the direction of |Ep〉 − |Ep〉, |E0,0〉, |E1,1〉 and |E+,−〉, |E−,+〉 are
symmetrically located on each side of |Ep〉+ |Ep〉, respectively. There is an interesting mu-
tually exclusive relationship between the angle of |E0,0〉, |E1,1〉 relative to |Ep〉 + |Ep〉 and
the angle of |E+,+〉, |E−,−〉 relative to |Ep〉 + |Ep〉. For example, when |E0,0〉, |E1,1〉 are far
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FIG. 2. Schematic illustration of the quantum USD measurement of Eve’s collective attack in
(a) Z-basis and (b) X-basis representations. The states |E0,0〉, |E1,1〉 and |E+,−〉, |E−,+〉 are
symmetrically located on each side of |Ep〉+ |Ep〉, and |E0,1〉, |E1,0〉, |E+,−〉 and |E−,+〉 are in the
direction of |Ep〉 − |Ep〉. After Alice and Bob announce their bases publicly, Eve performs the
quantum USD measurement on his stored state which is entangled with an auxiliary bit. After
measuring the auxiliary bit, Eve measures his stored state along the direction of (a) E0 and E1 in
Z basis, and of (b) E+ and E− in Y basis.
from the direction of |Ep〉 + |Ep〉, the magnitude of |E0,1〉 and |E1,0〉 will decrease, mean-
while |E+,+〉, |E−,−〉 will be near the direction of |Ep〉+ |Ep〉, and the magnitude of |E+,−〉,
|E−,+〉 will increase. In the extreme case, when |E0,0〉, |E1,1〉 are equal to |Ep〉 and |Ep〉, the
magnitude of |E0,1〉 and |E1,0〉 is zero. At this time, |E+,+〉, |E−,−〉 will be strictly in the
direction of |Ep〉+ |Ep〉, and the magnitude of |E+,−〉, |E−,+〉 will reach the maximum value√
1
2
(1− 〈Ep|Eq〉).
Here we set the value of a to cosα and b to sinα. After hearing the basis chosen by
Alice and Bob, Eve should make a unambiguous discrimination between |E0,0〉 and |E1,1〉 or
|E+,+〉 and |E−,−〉 to infer the state sent by Alice. The best known option for Eve is to use
quantum USD measurements, which increases the detection probability from
1− 〈x|y〉2
2
by
conventional USD measurements to 1−〈x|y〉 for non-orthogonal states |x〉, |y〉[29]. Suppose
that at one moment, the base chosen by Alice and Bob is Z, Eve entangles an auxiliary bit
with |E0,0〉 or |E1,1〉 through weak measurements[29–31]. After measuring the state of the
auxiliary bit, Eve chooses two orthogonal measurements E0 and E1 to measure the quantum
states collapsed from |E0,0〉 and |E1,1〉, as shown in Fig. 1(a). In the plane formed by |Ep〉
and |Ep〉, the angles of the two measurements E0 and E1 from the direction of |Ep〉 − |Ep〉
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are
pi
4
and
3pi
4
, respectively. When the value of α is between 0 and
pi
4
, USD measurements
will be influenced by |E0,1〉 and |E1,0〉. It should be noted that in the above quantum USD
measurements, |E0,1〉 and |E1,0〉 are not affected by auxiliary bits.
If the state sent by Alice is |0〉, the probability that Eve could guess right Alice’s bit
under USD measurement is
pr0 = p0,0 (1− 〈E0,0|E1,1〉) +
1
2
p0,1, (14)
the probability that Eve could guess wrong Alice’s bit is
pe0 =
1
2
p0,1. (15)
The guessing probabilities for pr1 andp
e
1 can also be obtained in the same way. So on the Z
basis, Eve’s quantum USD measurement matrix is
pz = Az

 p
r
0
Az
pe
0
Az
pe
1
Az
pr
1
Az

 , (16)
where the normalization constant Az is equal to 4pe − 2pe sin2 2α, and pr0 = pr1, pe0 = pe1.
Thus under Z base, through collective attack, the Holove quantity between Eve and Alice
and Bob χz (E : A,B) is
χz (E : AB) = Az
[
1−H
(
pr0
Az
,
pe0
Az
)]
, (17)
where H (x, y) = −x log2 x− y log2 y. Similarly, under X base, the Holove quantity between
Eve and Alice and Bob under collective attack through quantum USD measurement is
χx (E : AB) = Ax
[
1−H
(
pr+
Ax
,
pe+
Ax
)]
, (18)
where the normalization constant Ax is equal to 2pe
(
1 + sin2 2α
)
. Then the total Holove
quantity χ (E : A,B) is
χ (E : AB) =
1
2
[χz (E : AB) + χx (E : AB)] . (19)
Fig. 3 shows the simulation result of the dependence of the total Holove quantity
χ (E : AB) on α. We can see that when the value of α is an integer multiple of
pi
4
, χ (E : AB)
takes the maximum value 2pe. When the value of α is 0, |E0,0〉 and |E1,1〉 are located in
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FIG. 3. Dependence of the Holove quantity χ (E;AB) on α. When α is an integer multiple of
pi
4
,
χ (E;AB) takes the maximun value 2pe.
the direction of |Ep〉 and |Eq〉, the amplitudes of |E0,1〉 and |E1,0〉 are both 0, the BER in
Z-base is 0, the maximum information Eve can obtain on Z basis is 4pe. However, for X
basis, |E+,+〉 and |E−,−〉 are both in the direction of |Ep〉+ |Ep〉, |E+,−〉 and |E−,+〉 are in the
direction of |Ep〉 − |Ep〉, regardless of what quantum state Alice sends, Eve stores the same
mixed state, the BER in X-base is 2pe. In this case, the amount of information Eve can
obtain is 0. When the value of α is
pi
4
, the situation in X-base and Z-base under collective
attack is completely opposite. In order to balance the BERs on X-and Z-bases, Eve would
be better off doing the following collective attack operation
ρABE =
1
2
TρφρET
+ +
1
2
THρφρEH
+T+, (20)
where ρE = |E〉 〈E| is the state controlled by Eve and ρφ = |φ〉 〈φ| is the state sent by Alice,
H is a Hadamard operator, which is used to exchange X and Z bases.
The collective attack scheme derived from BB84 protocol can also be applied to MDI-
QKD. In MDI-QKD, as shown in Fig. 4, Alice and Bob randomly prepare quantum states
according to two sets of MUBs agreed beforehand and send them along two identical optical
fibers to the third party, Charlie, for Bell-state measurement (BSM). The BERs on the two
channels are p (eA) and p (eB), respectively. For symmetric MDI-QKD, the BER satisfies
p (eA) ≈ p (eB). When the value of BER is small enough, the total BER p (e) of the system is
approximately p (eA)+p (eB). Eve can execute collective attacks on two channels separately,
and the total amount of information obtained is r ≤ 2 (p (eA) + p (eB)). In MDI-QKD, Eve
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FIG. 4. Schematic illustration of Eve’s collective attack performed on MDI-QKD. Alice and Bob
randomly prepare their states according to the pre-agreed two MUBs, then send them throught two
identical fibers to the third party, Charlie, for BSM. The BER p (eA), p (eB) in the two channels are
identical. Eve implements collective attack on the two states with two auxiliary bits, the quantum
operations operated on the two channels are strongly correlated.
could execute the following collective attack operation
ρABE =
1
2
TρABρET
+ +
1
2
THρABρEH
+T+, (21)
where T = TATB is the joint weak measurement operator on channels A and B, H = HAHB
is the joint Hadamard operator on states sent by Alice and Bob. In order to obtain the
information definitely, the weak measurements TA and TB on both sides need to satisfy the
condition αA = αB, where α is the angle shown in Fig. 2.
III. COLLECTIVE ATTACK IN ENTANGLED QKD PROTOCOLS
Entangled QKD protocols, such as DI-QKD[28], single-photon entanglement based
phase-matching-QKD[32], and non-entangled QKD protocols, such as BB84-QKD[33], MDI-
QKD[21] and twin-field (TF)-QKD[34], have many inherent links. Both of these two kinds
of QKD protocols need to select two MUBs to prepare quantum states. The final shared
key is extracted after announcing the selected base through a trusted public channel. The
security proof of non-entangled QKD protocol sometimes uses the method of entanglement
distillation[2]. The time reversal relationship between MDI-QKD and DI-QKD is satisfied.
Therefore, we have reason to believe that there are similarities between collective attacks in
non-entangled QKD protocol and those in entangled QKD protocol. Whether in Fock-space
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FIG. 5. Schematic illustration of Eve’s collective attack on DI-QKD. The third party, Charlie,
prepares a Bell state and sends the two parts through two identical channels to Alice and Bob.
Eve implements collective attack on the two entangled state with two auxiliary bits.
based MDI-QKD or wave-space entanglement-based DI-QKD, BSM is an effective method
to close the detection loopholes. However, in the conventional QKD protocol based on
two-photon entanglement, detection loopholes is one of the main factors limiting its prac-
ticability. Because the collective attack is a channel attack scheme, we temporarily ignore
the information leak caused by the detection-side loopholes.
Fig. 5 shows a brief experimental schematic of DI-QKD. The third party, Charlie, who
controls the entanglement resources, sends the two parts of the entanglement to Alice and
Bob respectively over two identical channels. Since a Bell state is symmetrical or anti-
symmetrical in conjugate spaces, Alice and Bob can select two sets of MUBs (or conjugate
measurement bases) to measure the quantum states they receive. After announcing the
measurement basis publicly, they randomly select some measurement data to construct
Bell-inequality to infer the degree of entanglement and BER of the system. Like the non-
entangled QKD protocol, the bit error rate of the system is Eve’s operating space for col-
lective attacks.
Suppose that in an entangled QKD protocol, a third party, Charlie, prepares the Bell
state
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z =
√
2
2
[|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B]. Alice and Bob choose measurement operators σZ
and σX in Z basis and
√
2
2
(σZ + σX) and
√
2
2
(σZ − σX) in X basis. Eve attaches his state
|EA〉 |EB〉 to each of the Bell state
∣∣Φ+AB〉 independently, then performs a weak measurement
operation on the joint state to entangle his state with the joint system of Alice and Bob.
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In a worse case, Charlie is Eve’s puppet, and Eve can instruct Charlie to prepare three-
body quantum states as he wishes. These two versions of collective attack are equivalent.
In collective attack scheme, Eve’s controllable range includes the light source and the two
channels, while Alice and Bob’s detection sides are isolated from Eve. Alice and Bob extract
the key on Z-basis and Z-basis from the same Bell state, the transformation relations of
Bell states in X and Z bases can be expressed as follows
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z =
∣∣Φ+AB〉X ,
∣∣Φ−AB〉Z =
∣∣Ψ+AB〉X ,∣∣Ψ+AB〉Z =
∣∣Φ−AB〉X ,
∣∣Ψ−AB〉Z = −
∣∣Ψ+AB〉X .
(22)
By substituting Eqs. (5) and (8) into triplet state
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z , we obtain collective attacks on
entangled QKD under Z- and X-base representations
TAB
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z |EA〉 |EB〉 =
√
2
2
[|E00〉AB |0〉A |0〉B + |E11〉AB |1〉A |1〉B
+ |E01〉AB |0〉A |1〉B + |E10〉AB |1〉A |0〉B],
TAB
∣∣Φ+AB〉X |EA〉 |EB〉 =
√
2
2
[|E++〉AB |+〉A |+〉B + |E−−〉AB |−〉A |−〉B
+ |E+−〉AB |+〉A |−〉B + |E−+〉AB |−〉A |+〉B],
(23)
where the states in Eve’s hands have the following expressions
|E00〉AB = a2 |Ep〉A |Ep〉B + b2 |Eq〉A |Eq〉B ,
|E11〉AB = b2 |Ep〉A |Ep〉B + a2 |Eq〉A |Eq〉B ,
|E01〉AB = |E10〉AB = ab
(|Ep〉A |Ep〉B − |Eq〉A |Eq〉B) ,
|E++〉AB =
1
2
(
(a+ b)2 |Ep〉A |Ep〉B + (a− b)2 |Eq〉A |Eq〉B
)
,
|E+−〉AB =
1
2
(
(a− b)2 |Ep〉A |Ep〉B + (a+ b)2 |Eq〉A |Eq〉B
)
,
|E−+〉AB = |E−−〉AB =
1
2
(
a2 − b2) (|Ep〉A |Ep〉B − |Eq〉A |Eq〉B) .
(24)
From Eqs. (24) we can see that the quantum states in Eve’s hands in Z and X bases
are the same as those in Eve’s hands, in Eqs. (6) and (9), under collective attack in non-
entangled QKD. |E00〉AB , |E11〉AB and |E11〉AB are symmetrically located on each side of
|Ep〉A |Ep〉B + |Eq〉A |Eq〉B, |E01〉AB , |E10〉AB and |E+−〉AB , |E−+〉AB are in the direction of
|Ep〉A |Ep〉B−|Eq〉A |Eq〉B. Thus the same quantum USD measurements for collective attacks
can be applied here. Just like the collective attack scheme in BB84 protocol, Eve can steal
the maximum amount of information when α is an integer multiple of
pi
4
.
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Eve operates on Bell state
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z using a joint operator consisting of a weak measurement
operator and a reverse rotation operator for α = 0,
TAB
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z |EA〉 |EB〉 =
√
2
2
[|0〉A |0〉B |E0〉A |E0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B |E1〉A |E1〉B] . (25)
As both
∣∣E0(1)〉A and
∣∣E0(1)〉B are in Eve’s hand, it will be of Eve’s convenience to set the
joint state |E0〉A |E0〉B to |E0〉, and the joint state |E1〉A |E1〉B to |E1〉. As in Fig. 1, we
choose two orthogonal directions |Ep〉 + |Eq〉 and |Ep〉 + |Eq〉 according to |Ep〉 and |Eq〉,
here we construct a pair of normalized orthogonal bases |E⊥〉 and
∣∣E‖〉
|E⊥〉 = 1√
2 (1 + 〈E0|E1〉)
[|E0〉+ |E1〉] ,
∣∣E‖〉 = 1√
2 (1− 〈E0|E1〉)
[|E0〉 − |E1〉] .
(26)
So by substituting Eqs. (26) into Eqs. (25), we get the three-body joint state
|ΨABE〉 =
√
2
2
[|0〉A |0〉B |E0〉+ |1〉A |1〉B |E1〉]
=
√
2
2
[√
1 + 〈E0|E1〉 |E⊥〉
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z +
√
1− 〈E0|E1〉
∣∣E‖〉 ∣∣Φ−AB〉Z
]
.
(27)
Therefore, according to Eqs. (25, 26, 27), we can see that when Alice and Bob measure
in Z basis, the BER of the system is 0, and the maximum amount of information that Eve
can obtain based on quantum USD measurement is 1 − 〈E0|E1〉. While in X basis, what
Alice and Bob receive is the mixed state
ρAB =
1 + 〈E0|E1〉
2
∣∣Φ+AB〉X
〈
Φ+AB
∣∣+ 1− 〈E0|E1〉
2
∣∣Ψ+AB〉X
〈
Ψ+AB
∣∣ . (28)
In this case, the state of Eve and the joint state of Alice and Bob will be disentangled, Eve
will not steal any information, and the BER measured in X basis is
1− 〈E0|E1〉
2
. Alice and
Bob choose their measurement operations half on the Z basis and half on the X basis, then
the total BER of the system is pe =
1− 〈E0|E1〉
4
. To balance the BERs on X and Z bases,
Eve can perform the following collective attack
ρABE =
1
2
[
TAB
∣∣Φ+AB〉Z 〈Φ+AB
∣∣T+AB +HABTAB ∣∣Φ+AB〉Z 〈Φ+AB
∣∣T+ABH+AB] , (29)
where HAB is the joint Hadamard operator used to exchange X and Z bases. It should be
noted here that because operators TAB and HAB do not commute, Eve should first perform
the weak measurement operation TAB and then carry out the joint Hadamard transformHAB
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when conducting collective attacks on X-base. Just like the non-entangled QKD protocol,
the maximum amount of information that Eve can steal by collective attack on the entangled
QKD protocol is 2pe.
Finally, we compare the system key rate and the maximum tolerable BER obtained
by security proof based on entanglement purification and security proof against collective
attacks in the non-entangled QKD and entangled QKD. The secrete key rate of a QKD is
lower bounded by
r ≥ I (A;B)− χ (E;AB) , (30)
where I (A;B) = 1 − H (pe) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, the con-
straints of the system’s tolerable BER is r > 0. In this discussion, we temporarily ignore
all detection loopholes and the impact of post-processing. In entanglement purification pro-
tocol, the Holove quantity χ (E;AB) between Eve and Alice and Bob in a non-entangled
QKD, like BB84- and MDI-QKD, is H (pe)[1, 2], the maximum tolerable BER is 11%. While
in collective attack scheme, we demonstrate that the maximum value of χ (E;AB). When
the BER is less than 0.5, we have H (pe) > 2pe, which means that Eve can actually steal
less information. The maximum tolerable BER in the security proof against collective at-
tack increases to 17%. In entangled QKDs, Eve’s eavesdropping is monitored by testing the
violation of Bell’s inequality. Under the collective attack like Eqs. (29), the Bell function
satisfies S = 2
√
2 (1− 2pe). Quantum non-localized correlation between Alice and Bob re-
quires S > 2. The maximum tolerable BER in a entangled QKD based on the security proof
against collective attack is 14.6%. Therefore, the upper bound of key rate is obtained by
entanglement purification protocol, and the lower bound of key rate is obtained by security
against collective attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we deduce the maximum amount of information Eve can steal through
collective attacks for different QKD protocols. We find that in different QKD protocols,
including non-entangled and entangled QKDs, Eve’s collective attacks scheme based on
quantum weak measurement are equivalent. Among these attacks, the maximum amount of
information Eve can steal is 2pe. This proof not only enhances the maximum bit error rate
tolerated by the system, but also enhances the maximum key rate that can be extracted.
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This work not only gives a clear lower bound for the key rate of security proof against all
collective-attacks, but also helps us to have a more comprehensive and deeper understanding
of collective attacks in different kinds of QKDs.
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